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  Jonathan Davis 
Abstract
In this article I claim that Walter Benjamin's essay "The Work of Art
in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" merits renewed critical
attention. Just as Dada had confronted art with anti-art, so
Benjamin hoped his essay would confront aesthetics with an anti-
aesthetic. I examine Benjamin's capsule history of the aura and
show it to be misleading, criticize the essay's underdeveloped
ontology of painting and sketch an alternative, and draw attention
to the surprising proximity of Benjamin's notion of value to that of
neoliberal thought. I conclude with a critique of Benjamin's cultural
politics.
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1. Introduction: Evaluating "The Work of Art in the Age of
Mechanical Reproduction"
With the crowd in the Grande Gallerie, we might as well be in the
Metro as in the Louvre; the man approaching me with the uneven
step of one going against the direction of the pedestrian traffic
could be a tourist lost in one of the larger stations.
"Excuse me, can you tell me the way to the Mona Lisa?"
After I point to a doorway, he turns on his heel and hurries off with
the rest of the crowd, heedless of the heavenward pointing finger of
the Leonardo John the Baptist on the wall to his left. As I watch him
join the queue for a view of the Louvre's most famous painting, I
begin to reflect on an essay concerning visual culture that has been
one of the most frequently cited, anthologized, and (one hopes)
read in the last three decades or so: Walter Benjamin's "The Work
of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction."[2]
Observing this line of latter-day pilgrims advance towards Mona
Lisa, I am initially tempted to join the architectural historian
Richard A. Etlin in condemning Benjamin as simply and
straightforwardly mistaken.[3] Whatever precise sense we might
ascribe to Benjamin's "aura," his prophecy of its dissipation in the
age of photography and film would seem not to have been borne
out. This initial temptation should, however, be resisted, because
most of us do not turn to the artwork essay as a predictive
document. Instead, we more often read the essay with the sense
that is some sort of "classic," a foundational text for the
understanding of the visual arts, an early intimation of the
postmodern, a basic reading in media theory, or a charter for the
study of popular culture. We might have encountered the essay in
an investigation of the "Adorno - Benjamin debate," and our
assessment would then have taken the form of trying to decide
which of these thinkers was more authentically Marxist in their
approach to popular culture.[4] We might have even met some of
the ideas of Benjamin's essay before reading the essay itself; since
the early seventies, John Berger's book Ways of Seeing has
popularized some of the essay's ideas amongst Anglophones.[5] We
continue to read the artwork essay because we believe that we can
discover important claims there.
As I stand in the Grande Gallerie, I recognize that my initial unease
with the essay arises from a suspicion that Benjamin's claims about
art history, the ontology of works of art, aesthetic value, and the
relation of politics to art deserve closer scrutiny than they usually
receive. This suspicion would be absurd if it were taken to mean
that these topics have never been discussed before; one could
compile a lengthy bibliography of writings on this one essay alone.
Generally, however, those examining the artwork essay pursue one
of three sometimes-overlapping paths. Some have treated the
essay as an episode in intellectual history or as part of an
intellectual biography of Benjamin himself.[6] One variant of this
type explores the complex textual history of the essay, suggesting
that a version other than that usually read in the Illuminations
anthology offers a better guide to Benjamin's thinking or allows us
to extract a richer cultural critique from Benjamin.[7] Others have
chosen to examine the essay as an episode in the history of Marxist
theory.[8] A third approach, superordinate to the two just
mentioned, adopts the methods associated with "continental
philosophy," seeing the essay as an episode in the history of
philosophy; the tasks facing the philosopher are those of
interpreting the views of Benjamin and accommodating the essay
within the larger history of philosophy - or of "theory," if the
interpreter hails from a literary or art theory background. [9]
Less common are attempts to evaluate the essay's claims and
arguments substantively, to examine them less from a historical
point of view than from an interest in seeing if the arguments are
sound and the claims true.[10] There have been a few attempts to
examine the essay in this manner. In one of the supplementary
essays to the 1980 edition of Art and its Objects, Richard Wollheim
commented briefly on Benjamin's underdeveloped ontology,[11]and
five years later Jerome Stolnitz argued that the growth of mass
society explained the "apparent demise of really high art" better
than Benjamin's suggestion of the waning of the aura.[12] In two
articles, Ian Knizek suggested that Benjamin's essay obscures
rather than illuminates our understanding of works of art, but his
critical enterprise has found few successors.[13]
This paucity of critical analysis should not be surprising, given that
the bulk of Benjamin scholarship tends to be interpretive and
historical. Those whose background is analytical philosophy rather
than intellectual history, continental philosophy, or literary theory
might be ill at ease with the style of the essay, which tends towards
the declarative, the narrative, and the prophetic rather than the
straightforwardly argumentative.[14] This polymorphous rhetoric
reflects both the multiplicity of topics within the essay itself and the
multiple, shifting, and, at times, conflicting intellectual identities of
its author. One commentator has noted that in 1955 Adorno was
uncertain whether to classify him as philosopher, historian, or
literary critic. Half a century later we are still as puzzled as Adorno;
amongst those Anglophone philosophers who prize argumentative
clarity, the suspicion that engagement with Benjamin could lead to
entrapment in the labyrinthine obscurity of "criticism" has probably
aggravated the more general puzzlement about Benjamin to ensure
their neglect of the artwork essay."[15]
These difficulties in approaching Benjamin's essay manifest
themselves when we come to consider the "aura." Readers looking
for a lucid explanation of this concept in the artwork essay itself will
be disappointed. They might even be exasperated, after beginning
to grasp, perhaps with the help of a commentator, that the aura is
a power to generate a sense of reverence consequent upon the
viewer's belief in an artwork's uniqueness, authenticity, and
embeddedness within tradition,[16] to then be told that the aura
can be explained as "the unique phenomenon of distance, however
close it may be" as experienced by the viewer of a natural object,
such as a range of mountains or a branch.[17]
Readers hoping that Benjamin's explanation that the aura of a work
of art is "that which withers in the age of mechanical
reproduction"[18] will encounter a problem when faced with crowds
queuing to see the Mona Lisa. Readers might look beyond the essay
to what one commentator has called the "fascinating" and
"evocative" concept's history in Benjamin's thought for a clear
definition; these optimists will probably, as they follow the twisting
trail back to the Benjamin's earliest uses of "aura," agree that his
use of the term is not only "inconsistent" but also "infuriatingly
imprecise."[19] Their disappointment might deepen on learning that
the most important of these early uses of "aura" occurs when
Benjamin, six years before the publication of the artwork essay,
pressed the term into service to describe the effects of hashish.[20]
From the point of view of literary history, Benjamin the drug-borne
visionary is in distinguished company, but philosophers might doubt
that their understanding of Benjamin's reasoning will be enhanced
by the phenomenology of Benjamin stoned.
Understandable though these doubts may be, we can in fact derive
from Benjamin's reflections on hashish an insight into both the
"aura" and the artwork essay.[21] "Nothing conveys as accurate a
conception of the genuine aura as van Gogh's late paintings, which
could be described as all things painted with their accompanying
aura," wrote Benjamin reflecting on a hashish session in March
1930.[22] He was affirming, contrary to the sense in which the
theosophists used the term, that the aura was not a "magic ray"
attached to just a few things or people, but was instead an
"ornamental periphery" to all things and beings. As usual, Benjamin
did not make himself unambiguously clear, but in his remarks on
Van Gogh he was linking "aura" not only to the drugged state but
also to aesthetic experience. Perhaps the expressionistic
painterliness of the late Van Goghs, combined with some
knowledge of the Dutch artist's quasi-religious understanding of his
paintings, suggested to Benjamin that the thick impasto and vivid
colors could be understood semiotically. Van Gogh's distinctive style
thus becomes the outward and visible sign of a particular attitude
towards persons, places, and things within our sensory experience.
In this attitude, the objects of that experience present themselves
to us, evoking a contemplative pleasure at once exalted and
disinterested, dependent on our senses but not purely sensual, and
indicative of concerns of universal importance that nevertheless lie
beyond our perceptual and conceptual horizons. The reader familiar
with the literature of hallucinogens will be reminded of Aldous
Huxley's writing on mescaline, mysticism, and art,[23] while the
reader interested in aesthetics will observe a similarity to the
themes of Part One of Kant's Critique of Judgement.
Intellectual historians or literary scholars might object that this
attribution of such aesthetic themes to the hashish writing of 1930
goes beyond the textual evidence. To this objection, I would reply
that my interpretation of the hashish aura of 1930 is less an
attempt to contribute to the intellectual history of Benjamin than a
guess hazarded in an attempt to make sense of the artwork essay.
This hermeneutical gamble appears justified when we turn to the
artwork essay and read of an association of auratic art with
"creativity and genius, eternal value and mystery,"[24] when we
see the painter compared to a magician,[25] and when Benjamin
writes of the viewer absorbed in contemplation of the work of
art.[26]
Of course, all of these aesthetic themes associated with the aura lie
condemned in the artwork essay.[27] In fact, one of the main tasks
of the essay is to end the tradition of aesthetic thought that had
grown up since Kant. Just as the Dadaists had smashed art with
anti-art,[28] so Benjamin would explode an anti-aesthetic bomb in
the temple of culture. Let us see not only if the essay succeeds in
this task, but also if that success would be desirable or even
possible. Let us, in other words, evaluate the artwork essay. As the
previous paragraphs have shown, such an evaluation will have to
call on intellectual resources additional to those of philosophy; this
multidimensional assessment is, of course, required by an essay
that mixes with its philosophy, history, cultural criticism, and
political manifesto. Rather than attempting to examine every claim
of this complex work, I will, as suggested earlier, concentrate on
some claims associated with art history, with the ontology of works
of art, and with the relation of art to politics. The form of this
evaluation, in a not entirely ironical tribute to Benjamin, will take
the form of a stroll around the Louvre and its environs.
2. History: Reproductions and Rock Art
We leave the milling crowds of the Grande Gallerie and descend to
the floor below, where in all three wings of the museum we find
works of art that date from antiquity. According to the artwork
essay's capsule history of art, here is where we should find those
individual objects born within the matrix of tradition and invested
with a ritual or magical value, the ascription of auratic power owing
more to their existence as individuals than to their appearance.[29]
Only in the Renaissance, according to the essay, does the
ostensible but not actual separation of aura from magico-religious
cult take place, giving rise to a "secular cult of beauty" which
prevails for three centuries before its assumption of the form of art
for art's sake aestheticism and final incorporation into fascist
ideology. We might note here that Benjamin does not in these
pages explicitly mention the eighteenth century birth of aesthetics
as a branch of philosophy, but it would seem to fit neatly into the
essay's historical schema. As we stroll through the funerary
artefacts in the Egyptian galleries, the beginnings at least of the
essay's capsule history seem plausible. As, however, we continue to
move through those galleries devoted to antiquity and ponder the
essay's history further, the account seems not only questionable in
its narrative of the past but also conceptually problematic.
Pausing in front of a glass cabinet filled with Greek terracotta
figurines, we feel that we might have seen many of these before,
the sensation being not the inexplicable thrill of déjà vu, but that of
plain familiarity. In fact, we might well have done; in Greece, molds
for terracottas began to be used around the 15th century BCE; they
became widespread in the 7th century BCE. [30] Mass reproduction
certainly antedates the latter half of the nineteenth century. Of
course, the attentive reader of the artwork essay could point out
that Benjamin himself mentions antique terracottas, together with
coins and bronzes, noting that "in principle a work of art has always
been reproducible."[31] Unfortunately, the essay makes a
concession but fails to absorb its import; the products of founding,
molding, and stamping in the ancient - world coins, bronzes,
ceramics - were common objects, and, moreover, common objects
shaped in part according to aesthetic norms. This quotidian
aesthetic abundance of reproductions scarcely accords with the
essay's historical schema. Perhaps Benjamin would respond that he
is drawing attention to historical trends; only over a period of time
does a quantitative change becomes a qualitative one.[32] Such a
stratagem cannot, of course, immunize the essay against contrary
evidence, but can only suggest that the evidence so far adduced
fails to invalidate Benjamin's historical schema.
In fact, this schema appears ever more misleading as we continue
to stroll through galleries displaying the sculpture of classical
antiquity. We pass the Apollo Sauroctonus, the Diadumenus of
Polyclitus, the Venus of Arles, and the Aphrodite of Cnidus - all
canonical works and thus, presumably, all to be counted as auratic
- but also, as is the case with so many of these canonical works of
antiquity, all copies! The power of the schema's attribution of aura
to the original in the premodern period must surely weaken under
the weight of these marble reproductions. Indeed, if the concept of
the aura is, as suggested earlier, to be associated with the
language of aesthetics originating in the eighteenth century, then
early articulations of the auratic canons of beauty were themselves
in large part the product of reflection upon reproductions, given the
reliance of Winckelmann and Kant upon reproductions of works of
art.[32] Here Benjamin could protest that it has not always been
clear which antique statues are themselves originals and which are
copies after lost originals. He could also note that even in those
cases where later viewers have been aware that the antique
sculpture in question is not an original, the sense that only a copy
of a lost original survives is itself a sense of lack or deficiency and
thereby testimony to the auratic power of that lost original. In
addition, Benjamin did in fact observe in his first note to his essay
that the history of a work of art could include the "kind and number
of its copies."[33]
Such counterarguments in favor of the essay's historical schema
might have some value, but even if we accept them, Benjamin's
narrative of the birth, life, and impending death of the aura will
require considerable modification. As we consider further the central
question of whether singular works of art have been invested with
an aura, these adjustments to the essay's schema will become so
far reaching that they will eventually amount to the schema's
dismantlement. If we return to the sculpture of antiquity, we must
acknowledge the possibility that the attitudes of the viewers of
antiquity may at times have run counter to those that the essay's
historical schema would ascribe to them. For example, the classical
scholar Miranda Marvin has examined Cicero's remarks on the
decoration of his villa with sculpture and argues that he was
interested not in the work of particular artists but rather the types
of sculpture that would be suitable for a particular location, his
intention being to create a distinctive atmosphere as one strolled
through the buildings.[34]
This concern with using types of sculpture to evoke a set of feelings
within an environment, a concern which Marvin ascribes to other
Roman villa builders, assimilates the work of art to a decorative
fixture; the viewer's engagement with these works is surely closer
to the "distraction" supposedly characteristic of the modern urban
masses in an age of mass reproducibility than the contemplative
immersion or religious awe that the essay claims to have been the
prevailing attitude prior to modernity.[35] The defender of the
essay could point to the passage where Benjamin writes about
distraction and note that the essay specifically exempts architecture
from the historical schema. Since "primeval times," the essay
argues, we have used rather than contemplated architecture and
our attitude has therefore always tended to be one of
"distraction."[36] If the statuary of Cicero's villa at Tusculum is
properly regarded as part of an architectural ensemble rather than
as a set of individual works of art, then the anachronism of attitude
is only apparent, not real, and the essay's larger historical schema
still stands. For this defense to work, however, the essay's defender
must posit a way of distinguishing the auratic from the non-auratic
in the case of works of art produced prior to modernity. However,
the introduction of such a division would weaken the link between
the non-auratic and modernity so severely that the essay would
lose much of its point. Our suspicion that antique sculpture fits ill
with the essay's historical schema deepens as we read Marvin's
article and her suggestion that types of statues were produced in
large quantities in response to decorative programs rather than as
specific copies of individual works.
Perhaps the defender of the essay would minimize the importance
of Marvin's article, pointing out that it is based on a debatable
interpretation of some remarks of Cicero and her own arguable
conjectures about the place of statuary in a small selection of other
Roman buildings. If we move ahead to the age of the icon in the
Byzantine empire, we encounter the words of Theodore of Studium,
who opposed the iconoclasts early in the ninth century CE. "By
virtue of imitation [mimesis], the image and model are one," wrote
Theodore. In an unwitting proleptic refutation of the essay's thesis
that the aura of the artwork was an aspect of its singularity, he
likened the power of multiple images or copies of an icon to the
undiminished power of each of the multiple impressions of a signet
ring. Gary Vikan explains that Theodore was expressing a belief
common to the Byzantines of his age: the power of an iconic image
"resided collectively and individually in all copies."[37] This
conception of the power of the copy runs directly counter to the
essay's claim that the magico-religious power of the premodern
image depended on its singularity as a physical object with a unique
location in time and space.
The essay's historical claims look no better if we glance at later
eras. Attitudes towards copies and originals during the Renaissance
and the years that followed, supposedly the period in which the
aura spawned a cult of beauty, in fact defy the schematic narrative.
Towards the end of Veronese's life, his workshop "began to produce
paintings seriatim, an assembly line production where sons and
assistants duplicated compositions literally."[38] For a large
segment of his market, this form of production posed no problem;
the very distinctions that we might make today between workshop
copy and the original from the hand of the master were less sharply
made; what acquiring a Veronese meant to many was "buying a
recognizable trademark" rather than an "original".[39] In short, the
uniqueness of the original in the sixteenth century was by no means
fetishized in the way that the essay would have us believe. We
should not conclude that the century that saw the birth of
connoisseurship had no regard at all for questions of authenticity;
rather, these concerns coexisted with a primary attention to
matters of pictorial quality and function.[40]
Among the collectors in the eighteenth century, a similar division is
evident. Although verifying the authenticity of putative originals
mattered greatly to some, others were equally satisfied with
copies; the French writer Charles de Brosses, reflecting the
academic taste of mid-eighteenth century France, unapologetically
acknowledged that he preferred "beautiful copies of famous
paintings" to "originals by minor masters." Even if de Brosses was
rationalizing a budget constraint, he was not alone in his expressed
preference; a "vogue for copies" manifested itself in the formation
by notables of picture galleries composed entirely of copies.[41] In
the second half of the same century, France witnessed a shift in
taste from the lighthearted mythologies of Boucher to the domestic
dramas of Greuze, a shift that we can also see as a move from the
incidental pleasure of a decorative background to the rapt attention
depicted within and demanded of the viewer by the later
canvasses.[42] This shift from distraction to contemplation runs, of
course, in the opposite direction to the transition identified as
characteristic of modernity by Benjamin's essay.
At this point the defender of the essay might object that though the
historical schema might require some modification, the broad thrust
of its narrative nevertheless holds. Did not Benjamin rightly identify
the magical power with which painting was invested at the moment
of its genesis in the cave paintings of the paleolithic era?[43] Was
he not right in broad terms, if not in detail, to identify the continuity
between this ascription of magical power and the aesthetic aura of
an age which is just now passing? Responding to the first question
will draw attention to a common misapprehension about prehistoric
art; it will also help us understand the significance for us now of the
limitations of the historical schema that Benjamin sketched out in
the mid-thirties. Answering the second question will draw attention
to a conceptual problem that might well be buried in the common
understanding of the essay, if not in the thinking of Benjamin
himself.
The essay states baldly that "the elk portrayed by the man of the
Stone Age on the walls of his cave was an instrument of magic."
Today the specialist in prehistoric rock art would be unlikely to
share this certainty. In the first half of the twentieth century,
interpretations in terms of hunting and fertility magic held the field
amongst rock art scholars. These interpretations had been preceded
at the end of the nineteenth century by an understanding of
prehistoric art as evidence of a primeval attraction to art for art's
sake, and would be followed from the middle of the twentieth
century by structuralist interpretations, which saw the same cave
paintings as the representation of a binary gender division. These
explanations have themselves been succeeded by hypotheses in
which shamanism, psychoactive drugs, and what might be termed
early forms of scientific illustration all figure.[44] No doubt the
safest course to follow is that advocated by the paleoanthropologist
Randall White, who points out that the heterogeneity and
complexity of prehistoric art make the search for a single
explanatory model misguided.[45] In this light, an important
premise of the essay's historical narrative appears shaky, and one
might well ask whether the historical schema as a whole should
simply be disregarded.
Even if the essay's equation of prehistoric art to magic and ritual is
mistaken, we can certainly concede that at least some works of art
at various times might have had a magical or ritual purpose. This
concession does not, however, require us to affirm that Benjamin
was correct to posit the transition from the overtly magical aura to
the no less cultic aesthetic aura. As opposed to the difficulties with
the essay's historical schema that I have drawn attention to so far,
the problem here is more conceptual or philosophical than
historiographical. Readers who follow the essay's account of the
origin of the aura will be inclined to assume that aesthetic response
and the very existence of works of art as a kind developed in a
period after the cave paintings, and that they depend for their
existence on the growth of a conceptual scheme that accompanied
the transition from ceremonial instrument to exhibited work of
art.[46] This assumption parallels that made by commentators who
make a point of refusing to use the word "art" to describe artefacts
produced in the traditional, non-urban, and non-literate societies
beyond Europe.
Denis Dutton has argued convincingly against this refusal, and
there is every reason to think that his arguments apply equally well
to the way we think about the products of our prehistory.[47] In
general, we should not assume that those who do not share our
conceptual scheme and associated practices regarding art must
therefore inhabit a world without an aesthetic dimension. We might
note that Benjamin's ability to refer to marks on a wall as "the elk
portrayed by the man of the Stone Age" shows his implicit
recognition of the capacity of our prehistoric forebears to work in a
medium for mimetic ends. To attain these ends, this activity must
by definition satisfy certain representational norms; we can
reasonably suppose that the satisfaction of these norms provided in
the elk example a necessary condition for the adoption of a certain
attitude towards the product of this activity by both its creator and
its intended viewers.
If we are correct in supposing that this attitude included a sense
that the marks on the wall were in some way important or special,
and that this sense resulted in part from the recognition that the
marks on the cave wall satisfied representational norms, then we
are also justified in ascribing at least the germ of an aesthetic
attitude to our prehistoric ancestors. Assuming for the moment that
that these marks on the wall did serve a magical purpose, we might
even conjecture this magical power was then ascribed to them as a
consequence of their aesthetic quality. To acknowledge the
plausibility of this conjecture is to admit the possibility of the
relationship between paleolithic art and magic running directly
counter to that posited by Benjamin.
We should certainly remember Randall White's warning against the
assumption of a unitary interpretation of prehistoric art and
therefore acknowledge that some representational artefacts from
prehistoric times might have been no more the object of aesthetic
appreciation than is a wiring diagram today. However, we should
also be unapologetic about ascribing an aesthetic attitude to our
prehistoric ancestors if we believe that will form part of the best
explanation of the marks on cave walls that we usually term
prehistoric art. Two groups will object in principle to such an
ascription. One will be empiricists of a particular blinkered and old
fashioned kind who object to the use of theoretical terms at all; we
can be sure that neither Benjamin nor his sympathetic readers
belong to this group. The other group will be those in the grip of an
antecedent and general skepticism about the existence of any
aesthetic attitude that can legitimately be distinguished from the
expression or enacting of a nonnormative taste. This skepticism, all
too easily echoed in a reading of Benjamin's essay today, grows out
of a set of misguided political commitments and beliefs; I will
therefore leave further consideration of it to the section on the
relation of art and politics in the essay.
3. History: Dislocation from Tradition
A concern not so much with politics as with a broader theory of
sociohistorical development informs the essay's historical account.
Only an insensitive reader could fail to detect, on occasion, a note
of ambivalence in the essay's attitude towards the withering of the
aura. For the most part, Benjamin appears to be unsentimentally
single-minded in his pronouncement of the death of the aura and
the necessity of purging our language of the mystificatory language
of auratic aesthetics. Yet when he writes of the "melancholy,
incomparable beauty" that emanates for the "last time" in the
"fleeting expressions" captured in early portrait photography,
Benjamin makes evident his sense of loss. This ambivalence
regarding modernity and tradition, less marked in the artwork essay
than in some of his other writings, provides a staple topic for
Benjamin scholars;[48] it also sounds a sympathetic chord amongst
those many readers of Benjamin who wish to be neither prisoners
of tradition nor evangelists of progress. Those of us, however, who
are interested in evaluating the arguments of the essay rather than
understanding their place in Benjamin's intellectual history must
note how this ambivalence regarding modernity and tradition masks
a weakness at the foundation of the essay's historical schema.
The weakness manifests itself in the two conflated but ultimately
distinguishable accounts of the rise of mechanism and the
concomitant decline of aura in the essay. The tough-minded
Benjamin notes that at the beginning of the nineteenth century
lithography appeared and "the technique of reproduction reached an
essentially new stage."[49] This development foreshadowed the
invention of photography; the diffusion of this mechanical process
sealed the aura's fate. In this account, the development of the
technologies of reproduction is an aspect of what a Marxist would
recognize as the development of the forces of production; the essay
here could fairly be described as technologically determinist.
Corresponding with the less salient but no less significant mournful
Benjamin is an understanding of these technological developments
as part of the disenchantment of the world, the same
disenchantment that Max Weber had discussed in his lecture
"Science as a Vocation" just under twenty years before;[50] this is
the aspect of the essay that notes how the auratic was embedded
in tradition before the replacement of magic by mechanism. One
must be careful to note that this latter Benjamin wanted to distance
himself from a simplistic understanding of tradition as monolithic or
unchanging; he was at pains to characterize tradition as "alive and
extremely changeable."[51] Nevertheless, the unique work of art,
its aura dependent on its uniqueness, was always integrated into
some kind of traditional context. Only with the rise of mass
reproductive technology has the uniqueness and hence location
within tradition of the work of art been destroyed. In spite,
however, of a difference in attitude towards this severance of the
artwork from tradition, both the Benjamins of the essay agree that
the rupture took place in the nineteenth century. In fact, this belief
is misleading, as we will see after we leave the antiquities and take
a short walk upstairs to Galerie Michel-Ange.
As one might guess from the name, this gallery is where
Michelangelo's Slaves are to be found. Before we even reach those
sculptures, we cannot help noticing the seven foot high bronze
group of Adrien de Vries, Mercury Abducting Psyche
(cartelfr.louvre.fr/cartelfr/).[52] We walk around the whirling
verticality of the two nude figures; eventually our gaze passes to
the label, which informs us that this bronze by Adrien de Vries was
cast in 1593 in the Prague of the Emperor Rudolph II. Having been
carried off as booty by the Swedish army towards the end of the
Thirty Years War, Mercury Abducting Psyche was left in France by
Christina of Sweden during the travels that followed her conversion
to Roman Catholicism and subsequent abdication. After being
shifted around to park to palace, de Vries's sculpture was finally
deposited in the Louvre. Mercury Abducting Psyche emerges from a
variety of contexts, such as the Rudolphine court culture of
Arcimboldo, astronomers, and alchemists that nourished the erudite
allegory of this sculpture, or the manifestly self-conscious virtuosity
of de Vries, whose stylishly spiraling figures might serve here to
vindicate "mannerist" as a critical, if not historical, term.
"Tradition," however, in the sense of a pattern of belief and action
handed down from generation to generation and respected on
account of that transmission does not figure amongst these
contexts of protoscience and preciosity; even if it did, and even if it
were the dynamic tradition to which the essay alludes, we would
still have to say that the dislocation of this work of art from that
tradition took place two centuries before the invention of
photography. This dislocation took place as a consequence of social
processes and individual choices that together show a nascent
modernity. In short, the essay's historical schema cannot
accommodate Mercury Abducting Psyche because tearing works of
art away from "tradition" had begun long before the nineteenth
century. Of course, this applies not only to Mercury Abducting
Psyche, but also to the Slaves, and in fact, to almost every other
work not only in this gallery but also in this museum. The essay's
claim concerning the impact of mass reproduction on tradition
clashes with the reality that virtually nothing in the Louvre was
created to be here; almost all the exhibits represent a rupture with
tradition by virtue of both their passage to the Louvre and their
display as objects severed from their traditional contexts.
The opening of the Louvre in 1793 as a public museum is coeval
with the birth of aesthetics as a distinct topic in philosophy. We can
also see it as the opening of the doors to a new public for art, a
multitude less connected to artistic production than had been the
patrons of previous generations. This new public severed the
language of transcendence from that of religion and applied it to
the viewing of objects now seen in the public space by right, rather
than in royal or aristocratic palaces by the grace of their
owners.[53] Art prices rose from the 1860's onward,[54] and the
nineteenth century culminated not only in the language of art for
art's sake but also in the ascent to cultural power of connoisseurs
like Berenson; the connoisseur's authenticating word uttered over a
work of art sufficed to consecrate both its cash value and its status
as trophy to be boxed up and shipped off to the chateau of that
successor to the Swedish general and French marshal, the American
captain of industry. For this era, the essay's linking of the aura to
both the unique physical object and a language of culture worship is
appropriate. The essay's larger association of uniqueness to the
ascription of magico-religious power in the form of the aura, is
however, lost in this revision, and lost with it is the "insight" that
mass reproducibility entails the death of the aura. The claim that
Benjamin was really just targeting the inflated rhetoric of late
nineteenth and early twentieth century culture worshippers might
merit consideration from the point of view of Benjamin's intellectual
history, but such a defense risks voiding the essay of everything
that has drawn readers to it in the last few decades; one might just
as well claim that Marx and Engels were really concerned about bad
employment practices.
Drawing attention to the weaknesses of the essay's historical aspect
should not be interpreted as criticism of Benjamin himself. To
criticize an independent scholar, living the life of an exile in
straitened circumstances, for not having anticipated the scholarly
trends of the next seventy years in fields not his own would, of
course, be absurd. On the other hand, we should today perhaps be
ready to point to problems with Benjamin's historical narrative and
use these to challenge the larger claims of the essay. To do so
might not make sense if we were to be studying the essay merely
as an episode in the intellectual biography of Benjamin. However
the essay is, as noted earlier, frequently presented as a "classic" on
its own account; in fact, most of us would probably have little
interest in Benjamin's intellectual biography had he not written the
artwork essay. Ultimately, we are entitled to assess the essay on its
merits as we read it today.
An objector to my criticisms of the essay's historical dimension
might concede that these criticisms are more or less sound but still
maintain that they should count for little in an overall assessment of
the essay's worth. After all, this objector might claim, the heart of
the essay lies in its identification of how mass reproducibility has
changed and is changing our attitudes to the work of art now; the
historical dimension matters only insofar as it prompts us to think
about the fate of the singular work of art in an age of multiplicity.
To assign undue weight to a brief historical sketch is to ignore the
central questions the essay raises for the sake of pedantic
quibbling. This objection fails to take into account, however, that
the truth of Benjamin's claims about the singular work of art in our
time depends in part upon the soundness of the historical argument
that he makes. If this narrative of the history of the aura is
unsustainable, then the essay's account of the death of the aura
will also be questionable. On the other hand, the objector does
draw our attention to an aspect of the artwork essay that is
important but less historical than philosophical: the essay's
ontology of art.
4. Challenging Benjamin's Ontology
Let us leave the crowded sculpture gallery and make our way to the
top floor of the Sully wing, where we can find Watteau's Pèlerinage
á l’île de Cythère. As we think about the identity of this picture, we
will find ourselves doubting the essay's ontology. Before calling the
ontology into question, we ought to state just what that ontology is
and why it matters. With respect to painting, the essay assumes
the truth of what Richard Wollheim called the "physical object
hypothesis": the painting is a physically constituted individual with
a unique spatiotemporal location.[55] This ontological account
cannot apply to photography and film, the essay argues; moreover,
this inapplicability to the new media requires a revision of
attitudinal and evaluative approaches to visual culture. Some of the
essay's remarks on the revision in evaluation can help shed light on
evaluative concepts and practices that supposedly depend on the
aura of the work of art considered as a physical object. The essay
tells us that in an age of reproducibility we have a growing "sense
of the universal equality of all things." Presumably, the preceding
era of auratic objects was marked by a sense of the possibility of
the "inequality" of things; the equality or lack of it can only be that
of value.[56] The use value once located in ritual gives way to the
cultic value of beauty before its final displacement in the age of
reproducibility by an exhibition value that finally pushes the artistic
function to the sidelines.[57]
So the evaluative notion of beauty grows out of the limitation of the
objects of visual culture to discrete physical objects; once mass
reproducibility has taken hold and the old ontology is no longer
applicable, talking of "beauty" will be as absurd as asserting the
autonomy of the work of art or attempting to incorporate the new
media of cinema and photography within the old ideology of
"art."[58] In this new age, as opposed to the old auratic period, no
expertise or special insight is required in order for one's judgments
on visual culture to be those of an expert.[59] Dada anticipated the
liquidation of these evaluative concepts with paintings and poems
that made contemplation, and the evaluation that would emerge
from this contemplation, impossible.[60] So the essay's ontology is
supposed to liquidate aesthetics; we are asked to agree that
aesthetic evaluation depended on the work of art being considered
as a physical object and that therefore in this age of demystifying
multiplicity, we should be skeptical about aesthetic claims past and
present.
Later we will step outside the Louvre to consider what the essay
offers in place of these aesthetic claims. Now though, we should
consider how Watteau's Pèlerinage á l’île de Cythère calls the
essay's ontology and consequent aesthetic skepticism into question.
Watteau painted the Louvre Pèlerinage in 1717 as his reception
piece for the Royal Academy. Not long afterwards - the exact date
is unclear - he produced a second version that is now exhibited at
the Schloss Charlottenburg in Berlin.[61] (View both versions at
www.ibiblio.org/wm/paint/auth/watteau/.) The Charlottenburg
version is not a copy of the Louvre's; for example, in the
Charlottenburg version the colors are notably brighter, the
landscape of the Paris version has been replaced by the sails of a
larger and more conspicuous pilgrims' barque, and an easily
identifiable sculpture of Venus and Cupid replaces the less
prominent bust of the Paris version. Most, but not all, critics have
preferred the Louvre version; they have suggested that the
Charlottenburg version is less poetic in its rhythms, too strident in
hue, burdened by the addition of too many figures, impoverished by
the loss of the landscape, and flawed by a mechanicity of execution
in certain passages[62] In other words, we have two versions that
have been compared and valued in distinctly aesthetic terms. We
can best understand what the versions are and the significance of
the criticism if we abandon the essay's ontology and the
relationship it posits between physical objecthood and aesthetic
evaluation.
First of all, we should note that what we have in the case of the
Louvre and Charlottenburg canvasses is quite different from those
discussions that arise when a picture's authenticity is questioned.
For example, John Berger, in best Benjaminite mode, claimed in
Ways of Seeing that nothing more than a fetishization of the object
as property was at work in curatorial disagreements between the
Louvre and London's National Gallery about which museum's Virgin
of the Rocks is the autograph Leonardo, as opposed to a copy.[63]
In the case of the Louvre and Charlottenburg Watteaus, on the
other hand, nobody has challenged authenticity or authorship.
Therefore if critics have expressed an aesthetic preference for one
version over the other, this cannot have arisen because one is a
mere reproduction of the other. It might be retorted that the
Charlottenburg version, executed later in time than the Louvre
version, is a "copy" and that it therefore lacks the aura of the
Louvre "original"; this temporal posteriority would explain the
aesthetic inferiority the critics commonly ascribe to the
Charlottenburg version.
This argument, although not logically impossible, is nonetheless
implausible, because it fails to account for the opinions of that
minority of critics who consider the Charlottenburg version to be
superior to that of the Louvre. In fact, one can equally well imagine
critics finding the Charlottenburg version superior, and the essay's
supporters then explaining that its ostensible aesthetic superiority
to the Louvre's version grew out of the aura attendant upon
"finished" or "perfected" versions. In fact, we should think of these
retorts as a possible auxiliary hypotheses that could be conjoined to
the essay's main hypothesis, that aesthetic evaluation depends on
the aura which itself depends on the physical objecthood of the
painting. One of these auxiliary hypotheses would be added in order
to save that main hypothesis in the face ofprima facie disconfirming
evidence: the aesthetic judgments associated with the Louvre and
Charlottenburg Watteau canvasses. Nevertheless, we should not try
to save the essay by adding this epicycle to its theory of aesthetics
because another explanation that is simpler, of more general
application, and therefore better is available, namely that the
differences in aesthetic evaluation depend partially on visible
differences between the two versions.
We should now consider the ontology of the Louvre and
Charlottenburg exhibits. So far I have referred to "versions" - but
versions of what? The obvious answer is " the same painting," with
"painting" being qualified by "same" to emphasize the many-one
relationship of "version" to "painting." I will borrow a pair of terms
from Wollheim here; "painting" here functions as the "generic
entity" of which a "version" is an "element."[64] To decide whether
this relationship should be more exactly specified either as a token-
type relationship or as some other pairing matters less for the
moment than to notice that the relationship posited is incompatible
with that hinted at by Benjamin in the artwork essay. It is also, of
course, incompatible with Goodman's assignment of paintings to
the class of "autographic works,"[65] and with Wolterstoff's
insistence that paintings, unlike musical works, cannot be
considered as instances, even singular ones, of norm-kinds.[66]
This account of versions of a painting may have something in
common with Gregory Currie's theory of art works as action types,
but the objective here is less to tease out the finer points of an
element-generic entity ontology than to see real paintings resist
Benjamin's physical object ontology.[67]
Let us look again at the Louvre's Pèlerinage á l’île de Cythère. I
maintain that this physical object in front of us in gallery 36 is one
version or element of a generic entity of which another version
exists in Schloss Charlottenburg. The relationship of these three
entities parallels that of the performance of a jazz standard in Paris,
the jazz standard, and a performance of the jazz standard in Berlin,
which differs in many respects from the Paris performance, but is
nonetheless a performance of the same standard. So the
Charlottenburg version differs in significant respects from the
Louvre version, but remains nonetheless a version of the same
picture. The analogy with jazz helps us see that neither the absence
of a notation for painting nor the presence of significant differences
between the two versions should prevent us from seeing that in the
Watteau case we have two elements, or occurrences, of the same
generic entity. Before, however, anticipating any more objections to
the ontology proposed as an alternative to that of Benjamin, at
least one argument should be advanced for this proposal.
In the first place, the proposed ontology explains why in both lay
and expert discourse we group versions of paintings together,
compare them, and, on occasion, argue about the authenticity of
one or the other. The element-generic entity relation makes sense
of the Watteau exhibition catalog grouping of the Berlin and
Charlottenburg versions. To the objection that this ontology is a
revision of an established folk ontology, I would reply that the
existence of a folk physical object ontology of paintings is by no
means clear. Besides, even if we were able to establish by means of
social enquiry that such a folk ontology did exist, we would not
therefore be obliged to owe it deference. Just because scholars in
art history, art theory, and aesthetics will never produce anything
resembling the theories of researchers in the physical sciences, we
should not dismiss their theorizing about works of art as being of no
more value than putative folk theories of art. To think otherwise,
one would have to believe that either the logical empiricists of the
thirties or the "ordinary language" philosophers of the fifties had
correctly identified the forms and limits of meaningful discourse.
Since few would now accept either set of limits, we can hardly
regard the appeal to folk ontology as convincing.
Surely, though, the popularity of Benjamin's artwork essay amongst
many scholars in those fields mentioned in the preceding paragraph
demonstrates that breaking with the physical object ontology would
be truly revisionary; the element-generic entity ontology that I am
proposing for painting has not established a commanding position in
the fields of art and aesthetic expertise, so I am unable to suggest
that we defer to this ontology because of its prevalence in expert
theory. Other reasons, however, for adopting this ontology do exist.
We can note in passing that this version-painting ontology will
incorporate the ontology of painting into the general element-
generic entity ontology that specialists in aesthetics have found so
useful in making sense of other arts, such as literature or music.
Uniformity in ontology enjoys a significance beyond its appeal to
systematic minds; following the scientific realist approach to theory
appraisal, we could argue that its recognition as an epistemic norm
has facilitated the development of other branches of enquiry, and
we should therefore adopt it as a norm when theorizing about
painting.
Benjamin devotees will probably not be moved by such an appeal.
Sharing this unwillingness will be those who might distance
themselves from Benjamin in describing themselves as "humanists,"
but who, by virtue of this identity, consider the engagement with
the arts to differ radically from the scientific understanding of the
world. To both these groups of readers, I would suggest that
replacing the physical object ontology with the element-generic
entity ontology can help us make better sense of how we locate a
painting in history and some of the things we are doing when we
evaluate a painting.
The Louvre and Charlottenburg Watteaus provide us with an
example of two versions of one painting. Of course, most paintings
will only exist in one version, but the singularity of a version should
not blind us to its ontological status as an element of a generic
entity. When we consider a painting, we can use this ontological
duality to marshal our ideas about that painting's place in history.
Distinguishing a version executed at a particular place and time
from the painting as generic entity (with its own less easily
discernible but no less real spatio-temporal co-ordinates) can help
us determine at what level of historical specificity we should seek
explanations for a particular feature of a version. As we become
more aware of these levels, we can also become more conscious of
whether the features of a version or those of the painting - the
generic entity - are the focus of our aesthetic attention. How we
distinguish the features of a version from those of the generic
entity cannot be determined a priori. Instead, we will have to
engage in art historical investigation to answer this question for
each case that arises. We might, for example, find that this
ontology helps us understand the pictures produced in the workshop
of Veronese mentioned in the treatment of Benjamin's
historiographical shortcomings.
We will also have to follow this path of historical investigation if we
wish to grapple with the most serious objection to element-generic
entity ontology. Unless, the objector might argue, clear criteria of
identity and individuation are put forward, this version-painting
ontology will be pointless; what is to stop one from saying that all
of Watteau's canvasses are versions of one painting or drastically
reducing the number of paintings in the world by proclaiming that
there is but one painting Virgin and Child, existent though it might
be in many versions? On the other hand, one could claim that the
Charlottenburg Watteau exhibited in Berlin and the Charlottenburg
Watteau loaned to Paris for an exhibition are two distinct versions
of the same painting; one might even, drawing on reader-response
theory, claim that different viewings of the Charlottenburg Watteau
constitute different versions of the same painting.
The best response to this objection is to challenge the requirement
for "clear criteria of identity and individuation" by pointing out that
we know the Charlottenburg and Louvre Watteaus to be two
versions of the same generic entity by virtue of the history of their
creation; we can learn from this history that Watteau "repainted"
his Royal Academy reception piece and that this "repainted" version
is the one now exhibited in Berlin.[68] What counts here is
Watteau's intention. The similarity in appearance of the two pictures
might lead us to posit an intention on the part of Watteau to
produce two versions of the same picture, but the similarity does
not in itself constitute grounds for declaring two objects to be
elements of one generic entity. Certainly we can use similarity as a
guide to our historical narrative; in the absence of the
documentation concerning the Louvre and Charlottenburg Watteaus,
we might argue from their appearance that the best explanation of
the visual relationship between the two was the intention of the
artist to "repaint" a picture. If, however, resemblance alone
sufficed, we would have no principled objection to grouping any
similar looking pictures together as different versions of one
painting. Such a result would be no more helpful than declaring
that morphological similarities between organisms entitle us to
declare them members of the same species. Just as biologists make
species membership dependent on a certain history of common
descent rather than on a phenotypic or genotypic feature, so we
should make membership of the generic entity of painting
dependent on the historical fact of intent. Of course, this historical
approach will have to be supplemented to accommodate practices
such as workshop production, copying, and forgery, but there is no
reason to think that such accommodation is impossible.
This emphasis on intent rather than appearance opens the door to
another objection to the ontology proposed here as an alternative
to the physical object hypothesis underlying the artwork essay.
Imagine Watteau in the grips of an illness that seriously degrades
his vision. He intends to produce a third version of the Pèlerinage á
l’île de Cythère, but as a result of his near blindness the finished
canvas is nothing but an unrecognizable mass of blots and streaks.
Do we have a third element of our generic entity here, to be
counted alongside those of the Louvre and Schloss Charlottenburg?
Or does this show the soundness of Wolterstoff's argument that
painting should not be accorded an ontology of element and generic
entity on account of the absence of those criteria of correctness
that determine "norm kinds" in music?[69]
Thinking back to the analogy drawn between the Berlin and Paris
Watteaus and two performances of a jazz standard will help us
answer these questions. If we were to hear a third jazz
performance, one that was quite unrecognizable as a version of the
standard that we had heard in London or Paris, and then learned
that it was, in fact, that standard performed in a style which made
that standard difficult to recognize, we would probably accept it as
a performance of that standard. We would probably supplement
that acceptance with critical observations about the style in which
the piece had been rendered. On the other hand, were we to hear a
fourth performance of such obvious incompetence that it amounted
to little more than noise, we would probably not accept it as a
version of the standard; we could justify that non-acceptance by
pointing out that to intend to do something implies that certain
goals or criteria to be met in a resultant action are partially
constitutive of an intention. Such an approach would not require us
to declare the sick Watteau's canvas another version of the
Pèlerinage. We could also respond to Wolterstoff by noting that
norms do determine what can count as an element of a generic
entity in painting, even though these norms, unlike those of
classical music are not expressed in standardized public
conventions.
These ontological considerations suggest that an alternative exists
to the physical object hypothesis that underlies the central
arguments of the artwork essay, and this element - generic entity
alternative can explain how responding aesthetically to paintings
amounts to more than being in the grip of an obsolescent cult. As
the examples of the preceding paragraph show, we respond to
painting based on what we see, to be sure, but on much more
besides; history and our conjectures regarding the intentions of the
artist are but two of a host of considerations that both shape and
justify our responses. So these responses need not necessarily be
simple, varying as they will according to our expectations, beliefs,
and critical abilities. This complexity suggests that our responses
grow not only from socio-economic processes as those are
commonly understood, such as changes in techniques and relations
of production or various forms of social stratification, but also as a
consequence of aesthetic experience, intellectual development, and
exposure to criticism. Yet many readers of the artwork essay will
suspect that drawing attention to this complexity of aesthetic
response is merely an attempt to update the older auratic
vocabulary of "creativity and genius, eternal value and mystery."
5. From Communism to Consumerism
These readers have grounds for their suspicion - up to a point. Few
of us today would be able to use that vocabulary unmodified; we
cannot simply brush away the knowledge we now have of the
historicity of judgments of value and proclaim in pretended
innocence the language of Kantian aesthetics. Yet even though we
cannot reinhabit the world of the eighteenth century pioneers of
aesthetics, we can acknowledge that the question that they posed,
of how we can distinguish expressions of personal taste from
normative aesthetic judgments, cannot be immediately dismissed.
Even if we think that question is itself not properly posed, we can
certainly acknowledge that those philosophers began to provide us
with a way of talking about both how we might justify our aesthetic
evaluation and the aesthetic experience in itself. The artwork essay
pronounces this language dead in an age of mechanical
reproduction.
We can understand this pronouncement and its implications better
if we descend to the Hall Napoleon and make our way into the
adjoining Carrousel du Louvre. This space is, of course, a shopping
mall. The inverted pyramid which we encounter between the entry
to the Louvre and the Virgin store features in The Da Vinci Code;
the film version's assignment of a crucial role to Leonardo's works
in a narrative that combines conspiracy theory and New Age
religiosity demonstrates Benjamin's limitations as a prophet not
only of the future of the museum work of art but also of the motion
picture. Yet success in prophecy, as was noted at the beginning of
this article, can hardly be accounted as the sole or even main
criterion for the evaluation of Benjamin's essay. Instead, as we
stand in this new arcade of twenty-first century consumer
capitalism, we can best evaluate the artwork essay's claims
concerning aesthetic value and experience by considering them in a
broader historical context than is customary, which entails going
beyond the now well worn tracks of the Adorno-Benjamin debate.
The first element of this broader perspective is to be found in a text
published shortly before Benjamin's essay, the 1932 Essay on the
Nature and Significance of Economic Science by Lionel Robbins.
Although Robbins, a British academic economist who later exercised
enormous influence on the organization of higher education in the
UK, might seem to have nothing in common with Benjamin, his
Essay not only gives sharp expression to beliefs that would come to
underpin the post New Deal, post-Keynesian neoliberal order, but
also shows in respect of one of these beliefs a troubling overlap
with Benjamin's artwork essay. This overlap occurs when Robbins,
after arguing for the impossibility of interpersonal comparisons of
utility, explained the significance of this incommensurability;
economics, Robbins declared, "is incapable of deciding as between
the desirability of different ends. It is fundamentally distinct from
Ethics."[70]
The positivist leanings of Robbins convinced him that economics
could only be put on a scientific basis by purging the discipline of
the Benthamite tendency to derive policy recommendations from
the quantification and aggregation of individual utilities. As far as
the Robbins of the thirties was concerned, to remove these
recommendations from "science" to "ethics" was to remove them
from the scope of rational discourse and scrutiny. In promoting this
purge, Robbins struck out against an older tradition of incorporating
social welfare into economics under the guise of utility; this tradition
still animated his contemporary, Keynes. One consequence,
however, of this ban on the interpersonal comparison of utilities is
to rehabilitate another element of the Benthamite heritage:
"Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the
arts and sciences of music and poetry," wrote Bentham[71], in
unwitting anticipation of not only Robbins and his neoliberal
progeny but also Benjamin and his successor scholars in cultural
studies. Accordingly, the only rational discussion of value to be had
is in terms of the satisfaction of preferences. One turns to
Benjamin's pronouncements that in the postauratic age of film and
sports, "everybody is somewhat of an expert"[72] with the gloomy
recognition that both Robbins and Benjamin want to declare
questions of value to be beyond the bounds of reasoned discourse.
Of course, the relation between the two views is one of overlap
rather than of congruence. For Robbins, the satisfaction of
preferences takes place in the activities of the market. For
Benjamin, on the other hand, these preferences both arise from
and are organized by the experience of the postauratic collective.
This description of the collective process is in itself disturbing.
Benjamin's account of this process, no doubt intended as a
cheerfully demystified prophecy of a socialist future, reads
uncannily like a quotation from one of the American postwar critics
of "mass culture" such as Dwight Mac Donald or David Riesman:
"Individual reactions are predetermined by the mass audience
response they are about to produce the moment these responses
become manifest they control each other."[73] Yet in spite of these
differences in their conceptions of the social processes at work, both
Benjamin and Robbins shared a conviction that to assert the
existence of value beyond taste or preference could only obscure
our understanding of modern life.
The Virgin megastore in the Carrousel du Louvre provides us with a
material demonstration of this overlap. Walking through the store,
we see that Benjamin's prophecy has been realized as one version
of the cultural future, rather than as Benjamin himself envisaged it,
the only alternative to fascism. More or less everything that
Benjamin imagined can be found inside the Virgin megastore -
DVDs in which the freeze-frame possibilities and assorted
commentaries demystify the film as effectively as Benjamin hoped,
an abundance of reproductions untethered from any dependency on
ritual and displayed with the "distracted" in mind, and a generalized
equalization of all works of art. When we ask in what form this
equalization has taken place and recognize the answer as
"commodity," we are also aware that the Virgin megastore is not
merely a version of the future, but a competitor with the museum -
one aspect of the continuing struggle of the neoliberal successors of
Robbins against Keynesians, social democrats, the left - anybody, in
fact, who might dare to think that value can be rationally discussed
independently of consumer preferences and that public institutions
can reflect those values. The Virgin store belongs to the business
empire of "hippie capitalist" Richard Branson, whose success ,
beginning in the late sixties, exemplifies the triumph of the
antitraditionalist entrepreneur in the years that the postwar
Keynesian consensus collapsed and a renewed interest in Benjamin
in general and his artwork essay in particular nourished a
postmodern insensibility to an older tradition of aesthetics.[74] The
anchor position of the Virgin store in the Carrousel du Louvre shows
that, contrary to Benjamin's hopes, the development of
reproductive technologies has benefited retailers rather than
revolutionaries.
The link between the artwork essay and consumerism extends to
the very understanding of the aesthetic experience itself. In the
artwork essay, Benjamin contrasted the auratic with the postauratic
in terms of distance and closeness.[75] This language of proximity,
a reworking of Alois Riegl's distinction between haptic and optic
perception,[76] functions associatively and metaphorically in the
artwork essay to establish a series of contrasting pairs. So
"contemplation" of the distant and "distraction" by the proximate
characterize the experience of the auratic and the postauratic
respectively. Riegl's distinction between haptic perception's mental
synthesis of discontinuous sensory inputs and optic perception's
synoptic survey of objects in space ostensibly provided Benjamin
with the raw material for his own historicization of perception.
Beyond, however, the dubious psychology of perception underlying
Riegl's distinction or the apparent suitability of that distinction for
demarcating the sensory experience of modernity, the appeal of
Riegl's distinction to Benjamin and of Benjamin's adaptation of that
distinction to readers of the artwork essay lies in its potential for
the elevation of impulse over reflection.
Under the heading of "impulse" we can subsume both the tastes of
the observers-cum-experts of Benjamin's essay and the tastes of
the shoppers in the Virgin megastore. The former set of impulses
are synthesized within the collective life of the urban proletariat as
the deepening crisis of capitalism makes socialist revolution the
exclusive alternative to fascism, while the latter are synthesized
within the operations of the market, which includes the preferences
of consumers operating under budget constraints. In neither case
can there be any appeal to anything beyond those impulses, or any
search for a higher order perspective within which to reflect upon
these impulses, for reference to either the vocabulary of aesthetic
value or that of social value considered as more than the
satisfaction of individual preferences would be a vain appeal to a
tradition at once mystificatory and moribund in the face of the
nascent revolution, whether that revolution be of the proletariat or
of the market. Closeness, distraction, and the haptic all provide
metaphors to describe the aesthetic experience as the impulsive
satisfaction of preferences. Just as we should not be surprised that
Benjamin could not foresee that consumerism, rather than
communism, would fulfill his antitraditionalist prophecy of the new
aesthetic experience, so we should not be astonished that the
reputation of the artwork essay as a prophetic text has grown in
the four decades that has seen the political ascendancy of the
ideological heirs to Lionel Robbins with their exaltation of consumer
sovereignty and their celebration of markets. In noting this
simultaneity, however, we should be careful not to claim that the
rise of neoliberal thought is the sole or even main reason for the
success of the Benjamin essay; to explain that success, we should
consider the intellectual history of West Germany and the United
States in the sixties and seventies, the birth of media studies and
cultural studies as academic fields, and, of course, the continuing
growth of the process that attracted Benjamin's interest in the first
place - the reproduction of works of art.
Yet even if we look at these historical processes, rather than to the
rise of neoliberalism, for the proximate causes of the popularity of
the artwork essay, we should still bear in mind the common passion
that animated both Robbins and Benjamin. In spite of their
differences, they shared a determination to break with a language
of value that had grown up over the nineteenth century but was
now, they thought, a dead weight upon the present. The artwork
essay added political urgency to this break by declaring it a central
task of those opposed to fascism.
6. Beyond Benjamin's False Dilemma
Benjamin, however, was wrong to think of the future as a choice
between the revolutionary liquidation of tradition and a fascism that
is heir to that tradition, and Benjamin's current enthusiasts are
equally mistaken in thinking that the sole alternative to acceptance
of the artwork essay's main theses is a hidebound cultural
conservatism. To see that we are not limited to these alternatives,
we need once again to place Benjamin's essay in a larger historical
perspective, that of the politics of the left in the years around the
publication of the artwork essay. The significance of Benjamin's
association with Brecht has long been noted,[77] but my concern
here is to make sense of the essay against the background of the
sea change that was taking place in the politics of the left at the
time of the essay's publication.
This transition can be seen in the change in line of the international
Communist movement from the Third Period "class against class"
position to the support of the Popular Front. These positions
represented something deeper, however, than the political stances
of the Comintern, for they posed two possible patterns of response
of an antifascist left to the heritage of bourgeois culture, if we
understand by culture a whole pattern of ideas, values and
institutions that incorporate the political and the ethical as well as
the aesthetic. Should that bourgeois tradition of museums and
parliaments and appeals to universal human values be denounced
as the rotten breeding ground for fascism? Or could that past be
critically appropriated as part of a democratic, humanist, and
therefore necessarily antifascist culture? These questions have a
clear parallel in the concerns with the ambivalence alluded to
earlier regarding modernity and tradition that runs throughout
Benjamin's writings. Nevertheless, the artwork essay points clearly
towards the drive to liquidate tradition that also fuelled the rhetoric
of Third Period communists. Just as this politically disastrous Third
Period communism gave way to the ultimately successful politics of
the Popular Front,[78]so we should seek an alternative to the
cultural anti-aesthetic leftism that the artwork essay represents.
This alternative should be a cultural matrix which nourishes an
opposition to the values of fascistic antihumanism through a
simultaneous engagement with modernity and the critical
appropriation of tradition.
That matrix exists, if we are ready to take a short trip in space,
time, and the Metro. As we go from the Louvre to Trocadero, we
should also travel back seventy years, so that we can step out to
the Paris International Exposition of 1937. We make our way to the
Spanish pavilion, where the attempt to win international support for
the Spanish Republic's resistance to military insurgence and fascist
aggression exemplifies the cultural politics of the Popular Front.[79]
Within the Josep Lluis Sert pavilion we find, alongside the paintings,
prints, and sculptures, exhibits in the newer media of film,
photography, and photomontage. We note that one of these media,
photomontage, is being used to demonstrate how the Republic is
safeguarding Spain's artistic heritage, including, of course, just
those types of artwork that Benjamin pronounced irrelevant to a
progressive future, against the air raids of Franco and his fascist
allies.[80]
What will become the most famous of all the exhibits, Picasso's
Guernica, simultaneously exemplifies modernism and that most
traditional of forms, the history painting. Just as consideration of
the painting itself in its original context shows that Benjamin's
essay was being overtaken by events, so Guernica's history in the
seven decades since the exhibition challenges assertion of the
fading power of painting. The location of the 1937 canvas as an
object in space and time has mattered, and not in a reactionary or
"cultish" way; one could argue that the absence of the canvas from
Spain until the end of the Franco dictatorship helped the restoration
of Spanish democracy.[81] Nor is this political potency confined to
the issues of the thirties; as the Spain of the twenty first century
grapples with questions of national minorities and varying
conceptions of citizenship, controversy over the location of Guernica
has once again become important.[82]
The history of Guernica also calls Benjamin's binary typology of
aesthetic experience into question. One can contemplate Guernica
and recognize that one's encounter with a work of art might mean,
contrary to the thinking of Bentham, Robbins, and Benjamin, that
aesthetic experience might involve more than the satisfaction of
preferences; as we gaze at the picture, we become aware that
Guernica might be awakening desires and fears hitherto dormant
within us, cultivating new ways of seeing, and, in the most general
terms, allowing us to lose ourselves within a particular visual
experience so that we might find ourselves anew. Only the most
obtuse amongst us, though, could fail to be aware that this
contemplation does not take place in an ahistorical vacuum; our
responses to Guernica as citizens of 2007 differ from those of the
viewers of 1937. Our response is in part shaped by seventy years of
criticism, the accommodation of modernism, Picasso's status not
merely as an artist but as a celebrity, and our common
understanding of fascism and war - to give but a few examples of
the processes that inform our viewing. We might understand our
contemplation of Guernica as an element in a continuing collective
effort, and this understanding should remind us that we should not
allow ourselves to be browbeaten by either the ultraleftist disciples
of Benjamin or the neoliberal followers of Robbins into believing that
the individual is simply the contrary of the collective.
In fact, the relation between the collective and individual experience
of art can be complementary; it is almost certainly complex, just
like the relationship of modernity to tradition, elite to popular, or
"original" to "reproduction" - a complexity of which Guernica
postcards, coffee mugs, and key rings remind us as forcibly as the
versions of Watteau. This complexity and the passage of seven
decades mean, of course, that we cannot simply take the cultural
politics of the Popular Front as a substitute for those advanced by
Benjamin in the artwork essay. We might, though, ask ourselves
which provides us with a better starting point for thinking about the
fate of the art object in an age of mechanical destruction; when in
the midst of a war of aggression, soldiers stand by as museums
and libraries are looted, are our responses better served by
contemplation of Guernica or by distracting ourselves with "The
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction"? [83]
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